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Abstract— In this emerging data-driven world, secure and ubiquitous 
authentication mechanisms are necessary prior to any confidential 
information delivery. Biometric authentication has been widely 
adopted as it provides a unique and non-transferable solution for user 
authentication. In this article, the authors envision the need for an in-
field, remote and on-demand authentication system for a highly 
mobile and tactical environment, such as critical information delivery 
to soldiers in a battlefield. Fingerprint-based in-field biometric 
authentication combined with the conventional password-based 
techniques would ensure strong security of critical information 
delivery. The proposed in-field fingerprint authentication system 
involves: (i) wearable fingerprint sensor, (ii) template extraction (TE) 
algorithm, (iii) data encryption, (iv) on-body and long-range 
communications, all of which are subject to energy constraints due to 
the requirement of small form-factor wearable devices. This paper 
explores the design space and provides an optimized solution for 
resource allocation to enable energy-efficient in-field fingerprint-
based authentication. Using Human Body Communication (HBC) for 
the on-body data transfer along with the analytics (TE algorithm) on 
the hub allows for the maximum lifetime of the energy-sparse sensor. 
A custom-built hardware prototype using COTS components 
demonstrates the feasibility of the in-field fingerprint authentication 
framework. 
 
Index Terms— Authentication, biometrics, Human Body 
Communication, wearable sensors, fingerprint identification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rapid advancement of technology in the last few decades has 
led to the escalating storage and access of private information 
in electronic devices. Hence, the need for a secure and robust 
authentication mechanism is extremely critical, prior to 
accessing any confidential information [1].  
A. Vision: In-field Wearable Biometric Authentication 
In this work, the authors envision the need for an in-field 
authentication system in dynamic, hostile and resource-
constrained environments, like the military battlefields. 
Authentication is necessary to detect any insider threats, and to 
ensure that no information is being leaked to outsiders.  
Biometric authentication provides a more reliable, non-
transferrable and convenient solution to user authentication [2]. 
In addition, a soldier in the battlefield would prefer to spend 
minimal time to authenticate himself. Moreover, logging into a 
mobile device or a radio, physically by hand can delay combat 
actions. Hence, a wearable biometric-based technique is 
necessary to provide a seamless in-field authentication. 
B. System Overview & Related Work 
The authentication technique for a military battlefield needs 
to be in-field, that is, the person authenticating the military 
personnel on the battlefield, is a few miles away at the base 
station (cloud). Several remote biometric authentication 
schemes have been proposed to address security weaknesses 
[3], [4]. However, these traditional remote authentication 
schemes are not in-field and hence do not have any energy 
limitation, contrary to in-field authentication with energy-
sparse wearable physiological sensor nodes. 
Figure 1 shows an overview of our proposed in-field 
authentication system. It comprises of (i) a wearable fingerprint 
sensor embedded in the glove, for biometric sensing, (ii) 
template or feature-extraction (TE) algorithm, (iii) short-range 
on-body communication using wireless body area network 
(WBAN) or HBC [5], [6], (iv) an on-body hub or aggregator, 
(v) long-range communication using LoRa protocol [7], (vi) the 
remote base station to match the received fingerprint data with 
the stored database. As seen from Figure 1, the fingerprint 
image captured by the wearable sensor node is sent to the on-
body hub using HBC or WBAN, which transmits the data to a 
distant base station, using LoRa. 
C. Contribution 
Specific contributions of this paper are:  
 Envisioned the need for a remote, in-field, wearable 
biometric authentication system for dynamic and tactical 
environments, such as a military battlefield. 
 Efficient on-body communication and Edge-Analytics are 
explored to provide an optimized solution for maximizing 
lifetime of both the sensor node and the on-body hub 
simultaneously. On-body HBC transmission is chosen to 
reduce the energy per bit and Edge-Analytics (high-accuracy 
TE) is allocated to the on-body hub in order to maximize the 
system lifetime. 
 Compared to [8], this work for the first time, utilizes on-hub 
analytics along with HBC to develop an efficient body area 
network. The application demonstration includes a proof-of-
concept in-field fingerprint authentication system prototype 
in hardware, using capacitive HBC for the on-body link, 
template extraction on the hub, followed by LoRa 
communication for the hub-tower link. 
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Figure 1: Vision: In-field Wearable Biometric Authentication System: Biometric 
data collected by the wearable fingerprint sensor (embedded in the glove) is 
communicated to the hub using on-body communication. The hub sends the 
encrypted biometric data to the remote base station (cloud) for matching with the 
stored database. In this work, in-sensor computation (TE) and communication 
(Wireless, HBC) modalities are analyzed, highlighting the trade-offs and best choice 
along with hardware demonstration. 
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 II. SYSTEM COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED IN-FIELD 
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM 
The in-field fingerprint authentication system comprises of 
biometric sensing, data compression, encryption and 
communication. As shown in Figure 2, the six prominent 
possibilities for resource allocation in the proposed in-field 
authentication system involve (i) selection of a wearable 
fingerprint sensor, (ii) choice and allocation of the TE 
algorithm, (iii) selection of the on-body communication 
technique. This section develops the optimization framework to 
perform resource partitioning for the authentication system to 
maximize lifetime of the energy-sparse sensor and the hub. 
A. Biometric Sensing 
Fingerprint image acquisition technologies typically 
involve optical and solid-state capacitive sensors [9], [10]. As a 
wearable device, capacitive sensors are more effective as it can 
be built on-chip and consumes lower power (22.3 𝑛𝐽/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒), 
compared to an optical sensor (66 𝑚𝐽/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒), although it 
provides less accuracy in terms of the image capture. 
B. Template Extraction Algorithms: A Comparative analysis 
The accuracy of fingerprint matching highly depends on the 
choice of the template extraction (TE) algorithm. In order to 
select the desired algorithm, two sets – (i) a high-accuracy, and 
(ii) a lightweight minutiae-based TE algorithm, are 
implemented and compared in terms of their accuracy, energy 
consumption, and the compression ratio (CR) [10]. Figure 3 
shows the comparison of the two TE algorithms against high 
quality (Figure 3(a)) and blurred fingerprint (Figure 3(f)) 
images taken from the FVC2002 database. As seen from Figure 
3(b, c, g, h), the sophisticated high-accuracy algorithm 
determines all the ridge endings (marked in red) and the 
bifurcations (marked in blue) accurately. On the other hand, the 
lightweight TE algorithm (Figure 3(d, e, i, j)) performs poorly 
in terms of accuracy. Hence, the high-accuracy TE algorithm is 
desirable for reliable fingerprint matching even at the expense 
of higher energy (2.94 𝐽/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) with 𝐶𝑅 = 227, resulting in 
compressed minutiae data of  
40032
227
≈ 176 𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 (Table 1). 
C. Communication: Intra-body and Long-range 
The fingerprint sensor node captures the image, and needs to 
transmit it to the cloud for matching. The energy-sparse sensor 
node transmits the data to the on-body hub using intra-body 
communication (WBAN/HBC). WBAN consumes an energy of 
10 𝑛𝐽/𝑏𝑖𝑡 [11], whereas HBC consumes ~79 𝑝𝐽/𝑏𝑖𝑡 [5]. The hub 
then wirelessly transmits the data to the cloud server using long-
range (LoRa) communication protocol (~68 µ𝐽/𝑏𝑖𝑡) [7]. This 
high energy requirement for LoRa transmission further justifies 
the need for a hub, since the edge sensor is energy-constrained 
and hence cannot directly transmit data to the cloud. 
Unlike WBAN, HBC signals are mostly contained within the 
human body making it more secure, and hence encryption 
energy for HBC is not considered in our analysis. 
III. PROPOSED BIOMETRIC SYSTEM: OPTIMAL ALLOCATION 
OF RESOURCES & COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
     In this section, the six different possibilities (Figure 2) for 
the in-field fingerprint-based biometric authentication system, 
using an optical and a capacitive sensor are quantitatively 
analyzed. Table 1 shows the necessary parameters used for 
analyzing the framework [5], [7], [9], [11] - [13]. The energy 
availabilities in each of the sensor nodes is shown in Table 1. 
The total energy consumption for the wearable sensor node 
as well as the hub, for one time user authentication, is given as, 
             𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒/ℎ𝑢𝑏 =  𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒+ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚+ 𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟           (1) 
where, 𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 denotes the image capture energy, 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 
denotes the energy consumed by the TE algorithm for one 
request, 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 is the communication energy to transmit the 
fingerprint data. In case of the hub, 𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 0. The lifetime 
(number of retries) of a node in the system is given as, 
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Figure 2: Six prominent Possiblities of the proposed Remote Biometric System. TE 
denotes template extraction. (a, b): TE in the sensor and on-body transmission using 
HBC & WBAN respectively, (c, d): TE in the aggregator and on-body transmission 
using HBC & WBAN respectively, (e, f): TE in the remote BS, and on-body 
transmission using HBC & WBAN respectively. In all cases, LoRa communication 
is used from the aggregator to the cloud. 
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k)             Key attributes High 
Accuracy 
Lightweight 
Pre-filtering or pruning    
Binarization using thresholding   
Morphological Thinning    
Minutiae extraction using CN    
Image Enhancement techniques    
Post-processing   
Figure 3: Accuracy comparison of the fingerprint extraction algorithms against high 
quality image (a-e) and blurred image (f-j) repectively. (a) High quality fingerprint 
image, (b, c)  Thinned image & the extracted minutiae using the high-accuracy 
(sophisticated) algorithm for the good image, (d, e) Thinned image & the extracted 
minutiae using the lightweight algorithm for the good image, (f) Blurred fingerprint 
image, (g, h) Thinned image & the extracted minutiae using the high-accuracy 
algorithm for the blurred image, (i, j) Thinned image & the extracted minutiae using 
the lightweight algorithm for the blurred image, (k) table showing the comparison of 
the key attributes between the two algorithms. 
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where, 𝐸𝑎𝑣  denotes the total energy availability for that node as 
shown in Table 1. Note that, for a chargeable coin-cell battery, 
𝑅 refers to the number of retries per charge; whereas for the RF 
energy harvesting, 𝑅 denotes the number of retries in an hour.  
A. Data Compression (TE) in the fingerprint sensor 
With the compression (TE) in the sensor (capacitive or 
optical), WBAN or HBC can be used to transmit the extracted 
minutiae data from the edge to the hub. Using Eqs. 1, 2 and 
from Figure 4(a, e), we see that the compression energy 
dominates and the lifetime of the coin-cell battery operated 
sensor is 119 and 122 retries (per charge of the battery), for the 
optical and capacitive sensors respectively (Figure 4(b, f)). 
However, it can also be seen that RF energy harvesting does not 
support TE in the sensor. 
B. No data compression (TE) in the fingerprint sensor 
In this scenario, the TE can be performed either in the on-
body hub, or the remote cloud. Now, using Eq. 1 and as shown 
in Figure 4(c, d), the image capture energy dominates for the 
optical sensor. Although it supports ~5K retries per charge 
(Figure 4(d)) of the coin-cell battery for both HBC and WBAN, 
the optical sensor cannot support energy harvested edge sensor. 
Using a capacitive sensor, the capture energy reduces 
drastically (Figure 4(g, h)), and it is able to support an energy-
harvested sensor with both WBAN and HBC. However, HBC 
provides > 128 higher lifetime (~142 retries per hour) 
compared to WBAN (~1 retry per hour). 
Now, we analyze the lifetime of the hub and optimally 
allocate the compression (TE) algorithm in the hub or in cloud. 
 
1) Data Compression (TE) in the Hub: In this scenario, the hub 
compresses the data and sends it to the cloud using LoRa. 
However, the hub of the system might serve as the common 
node for multiple edge devices, and hence we assume the 
available energy for hub dedicated to the fingerprint 
authentication is 𝐸′𝑎𝑣ℎ𝑢𝑏~ 𝐸𝑎𝑣ℎ𝑢𝑏 ∗ 10%. Using Eqs. 1, 2 and 
using LoRa (𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝛼 𝐷
2) for a distance (D) of 1 𝐾𝑚, 
𝑅ℎ𝑢𝑏 = 483 per charge of the lithium ion battery. 
2) Data Compression (TE) in the Cloud: Here, the hub needs 
to transmit the raw fingerprint data to the distant base station 
(cloud) using LoRa. As the LoRa communication energy is 
high, for 𝐷 = 1 𝐾𝑚, the lifetime of the hub reduces to 𝑅ℎ𝑢𝑏 =
18 per charge (using Eqs. 1, 2), which is significantly low. 
Hence, the high-accuracy TE (analytics) in the hub is an 
optimal allocation. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: ON-HUB ANALYTICS AND 
HBC-BASED EFFICIENT FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION 
In this section, as a proof of concept, we demonstrate a 
custom hardware prototype of the fingerprint authentication 
  
Parameters Values 
Energy per bit: WBAN 10 𝑛𝐽/𝑏𝑖𝑡 [11] 
Energy per bit: HBC 79 𝑝𝐽/𝑏𝑖𝑡 [5] 
Energy per bit: LoRa 
(500 m) 
68 µ𝐽/𝑏𝑖𝑡 [7] 
Energy per bit: 
Encryption (𝐸𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟) 
100 𝑝𝐽/𝑏𝑖𝑡 [12] 
Fingerprint image 
capture size 
40032 𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 or 320.256 𝐾𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 
Extracted Template 
(minutiae data) size 
176 𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 or 1408 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 # 
Image Capture Energy 
consumption (𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) 
22.3 𝑛𝐽 (capacitive sensor) [9] 
66 𝑚𝐽 (optical sensor) 
TE algorithm Energy 
consumption (𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝)  
2.94 𝐽 (high-accuracy) 
Energy available: Sensor 
node 
𝑅𝐹 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡: 1 µ𝑊 − ℎ𝑟[13] 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙: 100 𝑚𝑊 − ℎ𝑟 
Energy available: On-
body Hub 
𝐿𝑖 𝐼𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦 𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦: 4.5 𝑊 − ℎ𝑟 
Energy available: Base 
Station 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 (𝑛𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠): 100 𝐾𝑊 − ℎ𝑟 
# Minutiae data size for the good quality image using high-accuracy algorithm. 
Table 1: Parameters used in the proposed biometric framework. 
 
 
Figure 4: Sensor Node Energy Consumption and number of requests (retries) supported. (a, b) Optical sensor, with the template extraction (TE) algorithm in the sensor, (c, d) 
Optical sensor, without TE in the sensor, (e, f) Capacitive sensor, with the template extraction (TE) algorithm in the sensor, (g, h) Capacitive sensor, without TE in the sensor. 
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 system using capacitive HBC for the on-body communication, 
and LoRa radios for hub-cloud communication. 
A. Components and Set-up 
The authentication system nodes – biometric sensor, on-body 
hub, and the receiving base station, are built using commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) components, as shown in Figure 5, Figure 
6(a). For the sake of demonstration, all the nodes are battery 
powered to emulate the scenario of a wearable device. The 
biometric sensor node consists of an optical fingerprint sensor 
(ZFM-20), an ATmega1280-based microcontroller for 
fingerprint image processing, and custom designed copper 
electrode-bands for coupling the signals from the 
microcontroller in to the human body (HBC). An optical 
fingerprint sensor is used due to its wide availability, and for 
the purpose of demonstration of the in-field authentication 
system. The on-body hub consists of a similar interface copper 
electrode band to receive the data transmitted through the body 
(HBC), and another microcontroller (HBC receiver) to receive, 
compress (analytics) and transmit the data using LoRa radio 
(SX1231: 915 MHz ISM band). For reliable and continuous 
transmission of the fingerprint data, it is buffered in the hub 
using a SD card, before transmitting through the LoRa radio. 
Finally, the remote base station (Figure 5, Figure 6(a)) consists 
of a LoRa receiver, and a computer to match the received 
fingerprint data with the stored database. 
B. Intra-body HBC: Key Techniques 
In HBC, the transmitter and the receiver do not share a 
common ground, and completes the return path using 
capacitance to ground [13]. Hence, only AC signals can be 
transmitted (Figure 6(b), blue waveform) through the human 
body. The human body acts as a single wire, and hence the 
fingerprint data must be sent serially. However, standard serial 
transmission protocols like the UART that needs a common 
ground, are unreliable, and hence, a custom protocol is used for 
broadband data transmission. The received signals are 
attenuated due to the weak return path [13], [14]. (Figure 6(b), 
green waveform). To eliminate the 60 Hz power supply noise 
picked up by the human body, acting as an antenna, a high-pass 
bias circuit is used. In addition, to reduce the effect of in-band 
interferences, an integrator is used to increase the opening of 
the eye diagram [15], so that the received signal can be 
reconstructed correctly (Figure 6(b), red waveform).  
V. CONCLUSION 
This work envisions the need for in-field biometric 
authentication in a resource-constrained environment, like the 
military battlefield. Efficient on-body communication and 
Edge-Analytics were explored to provide an optimized solution 
for maximizing lifetime of both the sensor node and the on-
body hub simultaneously. As summarized in Table 2 (derived 
from Figure 4), the most optimal allocation involves a 
capacitive sensor, HBC for the on-body communication, 
placement of high-accuracy compression algorithm (analytics) 
in the on-body hub, along with LoRa communication for the 
long distance hub-cloud link, and finally fingerprint template 
matching at the cloud server. This work, for the first time, uses 
on-hub analytics with HBC, and shows a proof-of-concept 
demonstration of the in-field fingerprint authentication system 
with a custom-built hardware prototype. 
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Figure 5: Block Diagram of the Hardware prototype for in-field fingerprint 
authentication. Tx and Rx represent transmitter and receiever respectively. For 
system-level feasibility demonstration, a battery-powered optical sensor is used at 
the edge. SD Card is used to buffer the incoming data stream at the hub. Finally, PC 
was used to match the fingerprint with the stored database. 
 
 
Figure 6: (a) Data transfer between edge and hub using HBC. (b) Fingerprint data 
from edge (blue) is transmitted using HBC to the hub. Green plot is the received 
signal (distorted) by the hub, which then decodes the data (red).   
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Retries per 
hour 
TE in the sensor TE in the hub 
WBAN HBC WBAN HBC 
Optical 
sensor 
0.001 0.001 0.05 0.05 
    
Capacitive 
sensor 
0.001 0.001 1.11 142.2 
    
Table 2: Summary of outcomes – Fingerprint Sensor Lifetime (retries per hour) with 
RF energy-harvesting: Only HBC for the on-body communication can support >100 
retries per hour, with capacitive sensing and the analytics (high-accuracy TE 
algorithm) in the on-body hub. 
 
